Hegel's dick joke

Introduction

At the end of the “Observing Reason” section of The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel makes a joke (and not just a joke but a dick joke). In paragraph §346, the final paragraph before Reason transitions from observation to action, Hegel offers the following:

Phenomenology of Spirit §346 — Brain-fibres and the like, looked at as forms of the being of mind, are already an imagined, a merely hypothetical actuality of mind — not its presented reality, not its felt, seen, in short not its true reality. If they are present to us, if they are seen, they are lifeless objects, and then no longer pass for the being of mind. But its objectivity proper must take an immediate, a sensuous form, so that in this objectivity qua lifeless — for the bone is lifeless so far as the lifeless is found in the living being itself — mind is established as actual.

The principle involved in this idea is that reason claims to be all thinghood, even thinghood of a purely objective kind. It is this, however, in conceptu: or, only this notion is the truth of reason; and the purer the notion itself is, the more silly an idea does it become, if its content does not take the shape of a notion (Begriff) but of a mere presentation or idea (Vorstellung)-if the self-superseding judgment is not taken with the consciousness of this its infinity, but is taken as a stable and permanent proposition, the subject and predicate of which hold good each on its own account, self fixed as self, thing as thing, while one has to be the other all the same.

Reason, essentially the notion, is immediately parted asunder into itself and its opposite, an opposition which just for that reason is immediately again superseded. But if it presents itself in this way as both itself and its opposite, and if it is held fast in the entirely isolated moment of this disintegration, reason is apprehended in an irrational form; and the purer the moments of this opposition are, the more glaring is the appearance of this content, which is either alone for consciousness, or alone expressed ingenuously by consciousness.

The “depth” which mind brings out from within, but carries no further than to make it a presentation (Vorstellung), and let it remain at this level — and the “ignorance” on the part of this consciousness as to what it really says, are the same kind of connexion of higher and lower which, in the case of the living being, nature naïvely expresses when it combines the organ of its highest fulfilment, the organ of generation, with the organ of urination. The infinite judgment qua infinite would be the fulfilment of life that comprehends itself, while the consciousness of the infinite judgment that remains at the level of presentation corresponds to urination.

It is not difficult to find the genital references:

What may not immediately be obvious what he is trying to say here, or what the joke is.

Context

Reason (§231–§437)

The joke lies in the “Reason” chapter (§231–§437), which is all about attempts to transition from a purely individualistic system to a more “worldly” system that accounts for larger structures of the world and how one might fit into those structures. “Reason” is divided into three parts and we are concerned with the first part, “Observing Reason” (§240–§346). This section is about observing the world in order to make sense of it, as well as ones place within it.

Observing Reason (§240–§346)

The structure of “Observing Reason” is as follows:

  1. Observation of Nature (§244–§297): It begins with all-encompassing scientific ideas such as physics or chemistry, viewing oneself as a mass of atoms and compounds interacting with each other, but these systems are shown to be lacking in helping to understand the specifics of ones actual life. Then we turn to ideas that involve geological, biological or evolutionary views focusing on seeing oneself as an individual homo sapiens living in a set of environments.
  2. Observation of Self-Consciousness (§298–§308): We move further inward via looking at psychological, sociological, and logical laws.
  3. Physiognomy and Phrenology (§309–§346): The most dubious form of observation: attempts to read the inner mind from bodily features. Here Hegel turns savage and sarcastic.

Throughout, Hegel critiques the presumption that mind can be grasped through purely external, empirical methods. Hegel’s conclusion is that such observation not only fails but becomes ridiculous.

Physiognomy and Phrenology (§309–§346)

Hegel’s extended critique begins with palmistry and astrology, which he dismisses as systems of arbitrary correspondences:

§314 - In astrology, on the other hand, in palmistry and similar “sciences”, there appears merely external element related to external element, anything whatsoever to an element alien to it. A given constellation at birth, and, when the external element is brought closer to the body itself, certain given lines on the hand, are external factors making for long or short life, and the fate in general of the particular person. Being externalities they are indifferent towards one another, and have none of the necessity for one another which is supposed to lie in the relation of what is outer to what is inner.

These theories rely on surface appearances and coincidences. Their correlations lack conceptual necessity - its the classic correlation-causation problem.

We move on to physiognomy, the attempt to read character from facial features. Hegel treats this as inflated opinions, incapable of real knowledge, and ends with a joke about how little it differs from people complaining that it always rains when they put out their washing and so it must be the washing that causes the rain to come. He says:

§321 - The so-called “laws”, this kind of science sets out to find, are relations holding between these two presumed or supposed aspects, and hence can amount to no more than an empty “fancying”. Again since this presumed knowledge, which takes upon itself to deal with the reality of mind, finds its object to be just the fact that mind is reflected from sense existence back into self, and that, for mind, a specific bodily expression is an indifferent accident, it is therefore bound to be aware at once that by the so-called “laws” discovered it really says nothing at all, but that, strictly speaking, this is mere chatter, or merely giving out a “fancy” or “opinion” of its own — (an assertion which has this amount of truth that to state one’s “opinion”, one’s “fancy”, and not to convey thereby the fact itself, but merely a “fancy of one’s own”, are one and the same thing). In content, however, such observations cannot differ in value from these: “It always rains at our annual fair, says the dealer; “And every time, too,” says the housewife, “when I am drying my washing.”

He quotes Lichtenberg arguing that if one decides to willingly confuse a physiognomist, it is easy:

§318 - Lichtenberg, therefore, is right in saying: “Suppose the physiognomist ever did have a man in his grasp, it would merely require a courageous resolution on the man’s part to make himself again incomprehensible for centuries.”

and later he quotes him with a more biting and humorous line, saying that people will always resist attempts to nullify their own free will be claiming to have discovered laws determining what they will do in a given circumstance:

§322 - Lichtenberg, who characterizes physiognomic observation in this way, adds this remark: “If any one said, ‘You act, certainly, like an honest man, but I can see from your face you are forcing yourself to do so, and are a rogue at heart,’ without a doubt every brave fellow to the end of time when accosted in that fashion will retort with a box on the ear.”

This retort is to the point, for the reason that it refutes the fundamental assumption of such a “science” of conjecture, that is, that the reality of a man is his face, etc…

Moving on from physiognomy, we turn to phrenology, the idea that the shape of the skull determines the inner nature of the mind. Hegel in responding to this notion gets satisfyingly violent, suggesting that one ought to break open their own skulls:

§339 - When, therefore, a man is told, “You (your inner being) are so and so, because your skull-bone is so constituted,” this means nothing else than that we regard a bone as the man’s reality. To retort upon such a statement with a box on the ear — in the way mentioned above when dealing with psysiognomy — removes primarily the “soft” parts of his head from their apparent dignity and position, and proves merely that these are no true inherent nature, are not the reality of mind; the retort here would, properly speaking, have to go the length of breaking the skull of the person who makes a statement like that, in order to demonstrate to him in a manner as palpable as his own wisdom that a bone is nothing of an inherent nature at all for a man., still less his true reality.

Before getting to the point of the article, I would also like to highlight something Hegel says when turning to the skull, just because it’s a nice line:

328 - What has been here determined is, in the first instance, merely that just as the brain is the caput vivum (the living head), the skull is the caput mortuum (the dead head).

The joke

If we return to the original quote, what is being said here? With phrenology exhausted, the last observational refuge is with the brain. Here is the setup in §346:

§346 - Brain-fibres and the like, looked at as forms of the being of mind, are already an imagined, a merely hypothetical actuality of mind — not its presented reality, not its felt, seen, in short not its true reality. If they are present to us, if they are seen, they are lifeless objects, and then no longer pass for the being of mind. But its objectivity proper must take an immediate, a sensuous form, so that in this objectivity qua lifeless — for the bone is lifeless so far as the lifeless is found in the living being itself — mind is established as actual.

His point: identifying mind with the brain is not intuitively grasped; it’s speculative. A brain, as such, is only visible once someone is dead. Mind, by contrast, is experienced as living, as subject. Empirical science can dissect a corpse, but it cannot grasp subjectivity, or if it can, it can only do so as secondary to the original thing. We already know what the mind is from experiencing it, and studying the brain to understand the mind can only be known as true once paired against our knowledge we already have from simple subjective experience of mind itself.

He continues:

§346 - Reason, essentially the notion, is immediately parted asunder into itself and its opposite, an opposition which just for that reason is immediately again superseded. But if it presents itself in this way as both itself and its opposite, and if it is held fast in the entirely isolated moment of this disintegration, reason is apprehended in an irrational form; and the purer the moments of this opposition are, the more glaring is the appearance of this content, which is either alone for consciousness, or alone expressed ingenuously by consciousness.

That is: reducing reason to the brain renders reason irrational. The opposition between self and thing (mind and brain) is not overcome but frozen, and thus becomes absurd. This brings us to his final remark:

§346 - The “depth” which mind brings out from within, but carries no further than to make it a presentation (Vorstellung), and let it remain at this level — and the “ignorance” on the part of this consciousness as to what it really says, are the same kind of connexion of higher and lower which, in the case of the living being, nature naïvely expresses when it combines the organ of its highest fulfilment, the organ of generation, with the organ of urination. The infinite judgment qua infinite would be the fulfilment of life that comprehends itself, while the consciousness of the infinite judgment that remains at the level of presentation corresponds to urination.

Here Hegel is arguing that the idea he is discussing has very elevated aims - to understand the mind from the perspective of an organ - but it doesn’t live up to them and merely asserts a relationship between the two - mind and brain - without showing how the relationship between the two answers any questions about knowledge. That all that is being done here is of representation - representing the mind with the physical object of the brain - it is actually quite a poor insight dressed as a rich one. This differential between the richness of its aims and the poverty of its outcome - between higher and lower - is likened to an observation about the human body: the genitals are at once organs associated with highest (procreation, sex, and pleasure) and with the lowest (urination). One might imagine Hegel’s reaction to anal sex which is another connection between higher (sex) and lower (defecation).

Hegel then makes a joke: “The infinite judgment qua infinite [an understanding that appears rich but also lives up to its appearance] would be the fulfilment of life that comprehends itself [that is, it would correspond to the “higher”, to “fulfilment”, to sex and to pleasure], while the consciousness of the infinite judgment that remains at the level of presentation [the understanding of this chapter which appears rich but in reality is quite poor] corresponds to urination.”

That is: reason, trying to realize itself empirically, winds up like the penis - an organ that aspires to be noble (sex, creativity, “fulfilment”) but ends up just pissing.