I. The religious relation as a relation of substantiality

104 Had Schleiermacher only known this beforehand, had the hosts of his followers and echoers only considered to what outrage of philosophy they had to lend (if not occasion, for everything can become occasion, but yet) the gloss! And what disgrace for Christian theology, that it itself had to lend itself to this, so that philosophy could appeal to its agreement with the principle of Christian divinity, make mock of Christian theology and, with the appearance of right, by drawing the correct consequences of the theology of feeling, proceed to its blasphemies. It was not enough that Schleiermacher occasionally carped at the Hegelian philosophy, nor does it suffice if his present-day followers make as if they wished to make the Hegelians feel the superior power of the Christian principle by accusing them before the governments and keeping them away from the universities: all this is indeed something, is a just compensation for the disgrace which Schleiermacher's false step has brought upon theology, but it is nevertheless only little and it would have been better if Schleiermacher had left Christian faith its purity and objectivity, if he had not himself already flirted with philosophy and if among his numerous pupils at least one had appeared who had seen the defects of philosophy, who had understood something of philosophy at all The Religious Relation as Substantiality-Relation. 51 and at the same time had so much Christian sense that he could warn himself and his brethren against worldly wisdom and lead them back again to Christian truth. But there was not even one. They have all alike deviated from the straight path, all of them unprofitable*).

105 However, as said, the appeal to Schleiermacher and the theology of feeling is only an external appearance, a deception with whose help Hegel wishes to introduce his conception of religion, for firstly — as the Phenomenology proves — his view was already finished before Schleiermacher completed his theological system and his treatment of the Christian doctrine of faith; secondly, such a versatile spirit, who knows help for everything, could have used anything else for the introduction of his poison, just as Schleiermacher's theory of feeling was already given in Jacobi's philosophy**). Besides, Hegel appeals to the principle of immediate knowledge only because it was the most widespread in his time and because it suited him when he could „demonstrate in the culture of the time the philosophical basic concept as a general element, Christian knowledge reduced to its first elements, and could now hope that the philosophical principle would all the more easily obtain the assent of general culture***). He wished only to step for a moment onto the highway of the then theological procession, in order to draw into his path those to whom he attributed mobility and a diabolical instinct — otherwise, however, he would not have needed this appeal to the principle of immediate knowledge. Finally, he wished, maliciously enough! to use the opportunity to mock theo*) Ps. 14, 3. **) Actually Hegel also always speaks only of this principle „of immediate knowledge,“ as Jacobi developed it (e.g. Phil. of Rel. I, 43. 114.). He does not even mention Schleiermacher, although he polemicises against his doctrine of faith. He does not even give the theologian the honour of mentioning him by name, he prefers to go back to the simple, philosophical (Jacobean) foundation. ***) Phil. of Rel. I, 44. 48. 52 The Religious Relation as logy and to reproach it with the „boundless unconsciousness*) of which it makes itself guilty when it takes the field against philosophy or permits itself little carping against it. Indeed he was right against the Schleiermacherian theory, but a theology which has again become conscious of itself and has again grasped its holy task will make good the damage.

106 The circumstance now that Hegel polemicises against the theology of feeling, reproaches it with mere persistence in subjectivity and demands on the contrary that the Objective — which he also calls the „immense object“**) — be recognised, this circumstance has produced the appearance as if he wished to know of a universal, a substance, outside of self-consciousness.

107 But let us look and not let ourselves be deceived. We shall lay the acts of the process before you.

108 When one says that in feeling the belief in God is given to us, Hegel explains this assertion and declaration of feeling to the effect that its certainty, of which it boasts, rests on the fact that two kinds of being (— I am and there is God! —) are posited in reflection as one being***). „I am,“ that is the certain which is immediately certain, I cannot doubt my existence, thus being belongs to me, which therefore falls away from the object, so that the double being disappears, the object is only in me as my inner determinateness and the reflection on it, as if it were independent for itself, disappears. Against this conception of religion, according to which the divine is not a power independent of me but only a determinateness of myself, Hegel now remarks+), „it is one-sided to grasp religion only as something subjective *) Ibid. I, 48. **) Ibid. 1, 145. ***) Ibid. I, 120. 121. +) Ibid. I, 68.69. as Substantiality-Relation. 53 and thus to make the subjective side the only one.“ This one-sidedness betrays itself when a cultus is to take place, which is impossible if God is not presupposed as a truly independent object: without this presupposition the cultus would be „completely bald, empty, its doing a movement that does not get from the spot, its direction towards God a relation to a zero and a shooting into the blue.“ In itself, however, this merely subjective doing is inconsistent and must dissolve itself on account of its inconsistency. For if I am determined in any way, then, since as spirit I am necessarily consciousness, I must know of my determinateness, I must distinguish it from myself as pure, simple I, so that by means of reflection it becomes an object of consciousness to me. Now the religious feeling is supposed to be infinite, so the richer it is, the more I am determined, the richer and more universal must also be the object which I project out of myself and out of my inwardness for my contemplation. Yes, the religious feeling is supposed to be absolute, substantial, but the substantial is that before which my accidental individuality and the particular of my subjective opinion is the accidental; the substantial must therefore be distinguished from my accidental subjectivity, so that it is now recognised as that „which is rather the fixed in and for itself, independent of our feeling, our sensation, and the objective which subsists in and for itself.“ In the heart the substantial may not and cannot remain, for it is precisely the overpowering against the I and its contingency, and as such, as the higher which goes infinitely beyond me, it must be expressly recognised and presupposed. If man will not agree to this recognition of the substantial, „then God himself is only something subjective and the direction of subjectivity remains at most a drawing of lines into the void.“ For it can also take place on that standpoint of subjectivity that the I thinks it goes out of itself, that it speaks of an infinite to which it raises itself or in the 54 The Religious Relation longing stretches itself out, but this recognition of a universal is only the recognition of a purely indeterminate, „these lines which are drawn towards it have no hold, no connection through the objective itself and are and remain one-sidedly our doing, our lines — subjective.“ —

109 Hegel describes more closely the necessity of the elevation in which the subjective surrenders itself to the objective and sacrifices itself in the substance of the universal, in the following manner. The direction towards a higher, towards the infinite, is also not to be grasped and carried out in such a way that I remain in myself, in my finitude and in the here. For then „this direction towards a beyond would be thoroughly only my, only my doing, my direction, my emotion, my willing, my striving*).“ What I assert of that higher, infinite, has no objective meaning, says nothing of the substantial, but is only a declaration of what I do, how I am determined and how I move within myself. „If, for example — as happens in Schleiermacher's doctrine of faith — I use the predicates all-good, all-mighty as determinations of this beyond, they have meaning only in me, a subjective, not objective meaning and they fall thoroughly only into that my direction.“ In short, if in this direction towards a higher I repel myself from myself and distinguish myself as finite from the infinite, then this distinction is only an apparent one, i.e., it is not serious, as if I wished to subject myself to the infinite, but rather „it has its seat only in the I itself,“ it is only a division in myself alone, in that I distinguish myself as finite from myself as infinite and in the direction which goes beyond my finitude only prove my infinity and turn it out against my finitude. It is only mirror-fencing. Infinity belongs to myself and there are indeed different directions when I consider myself as finite *) Ibid. I, 172-174. as Substantiality-Relation. against the infinite, one direction goes towards me, the other outwards, but the latter also goes towards myself, falls therefore only in me, for „my direction towards the beyond and my finitude are determinations in myself and I remain therein with myself.“

110 This error — of the Schleiermacherian principle — also shows itself in the moral consideration of man. For if I remain in myself, have everything in myself, namely possess it in feeling, then I need nothing outside myself; as I have what I ought, so I also am what I ought, i.e., I am good by nature, I am, insofar as I am immediately good. It may be that I fall into errors, but these are only something accidental which does not concern my inwardness, my nature — for this is good — and cannot touch it. As God is nowhere encountered in my direction towards the infinite, for directing myself towards the infinite, I direct myself only towards my infinity, so God also has nothing more to do with the removal of my errors — for my inner being is good by nature, I thus need only to remove the momentary and accidental obscuration, which is caused only on the surface of my I by an error, summarily, „and I am reconciled to myself.“ I am the reconciliation of myself. As further the direction towards the infinite is mine and the infinite exists only as this direction, so it also requires only, when an accidental error is to be stripped off, the direction towards my good nature, i.e., I must have the conviction that my inner being is perfectly pure and good and „the reconciling mediation consists merely in this consciousness and knowledge that I am good by nature, is thus a vain, empty seesaw system. For I seesaw myself over in myself into longing and into the direction towards the beyond or into the recognition of my committed errors and I seesaw myself in that longing and in the emotion, which only take place in me, back to myself and am immediately therein with myself.“

111 What, exclaims Hegel over this theology of feeling, does this finitude then wish to live eternally? Does it wish not at all to sacrifice itself and surrender to the recognition of an objectively higher? Does this vain reflection wish always only to flirt with itself and never posit the finite as the inherently null? Does this reflection of the foppish theology then not get as far as nature? Can it not let die what is mortal, or is the null immortal? For nature indeed goes so far in reason that it proves the finite as that which does not subsist through itself and is not posited. In nature the finite frees itself from itself and renounces itself, in that it — dies. „Death is this first, natural, unprejudiced freeing of the finite from its finitude*).“

112 Well? How will it be? Will the finite really and actually get free of itself? Will it at last receive its right, namely to be truly sublated, to become infinite, or will it remain standing in its finitude?

113 With the expression of the deepest contempt — be ashamed, you theologians of feeling, and take it to heart! with a boundless contempt Hegel answers that it is only appearance and hypocrisy when the finite acts as if it wished to sublate itself, it rather preserves itself, the I holds fast to itself, does not give up its finitude and only thereby makes itself into the infinite, yes into the „effective, actualising infinite,“ i.e., it arrogates to itself the power, significance, yes the production of the infinite, in that it asserts and lets count only itself. „This is the highest peak of subjectivity, which holds fast to itself, the finitude which remains and — in that it is the only thing which remains and asserts itself, makes itself into the infinite, the infinite subjectivity which finishes with all content, but this subjectivity itself, this peak of finitude, preserves itself *) Ibid. I, 176. 177. as Substantiality-Relation. still, all content is volatilised and nullified therein, but it is only this vanity which does not disappear*).“

114 To this, then, had it to come with the Christian world and theology, that a philosopher, and indeed the most terrible, the most frightful philosopher, had to tell them the truth and reproach them with their sins, their vanity, their pride, their hypocrisy, their measureless arrogance and bring it to their consciousness? A philosopher had to say to the priests and prophets that they are „fools in prophesying and speak out their own judgments**)?“ A philosopher then — terrible! — had to say to the theologians that „the finite, which raises itself to the infinite, is only abstract identity, empty in itself, the highest form of untruth, the lie, evil?“ A philosopher! Indeed a philosopher! But what good can a philosopher bring us? He has overthrown the theology of feeling: what will he give us in its place? Timeo Danaos! Yes we must fear the philosophers even when they overthrow error, for we can be certain that they do it only to set a more terrible error in the place of the old. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes! The Christian must fear the philosopher even when he wishes to free him from all heretics and actually frees him. Let us fear him; No! let us only be on our guard when we now see how Hegel overthrows the principle of the theology of feeling and sets up his — certainly only more terrible — principle. He wishes to draw the proper consequence of that standpoint, namely it is to become serious with the sublation of the finite; but in order that this may happen, he says, the I must in its individuality, in deed and actuality, renounce itself***).“

115 To this, then, had it to come with the Christian world and theology, that a philosopher, and indeed the most terrible, the most frightful philosopher, had to tell them the truth and reproach them with their sins, their vanity, their pride, their hypocrisy, their measureless arrogance and bring it to their consciousness? A philosopher had to say to the priests and prophets that they are „fools in prophesying and speak out their own judgments**)?“ A philosopher then — terrible! — had to say to the theologians that „the finite, which raises itself to the infinite, is only abstract identity, empty in itself, the highest form of untruth, the lie, evil?“ A philosopher! Indeed a philosopher! But what good can a philosopher bring us? He has overthrown the theology of feeling: what will he give us in its place? Timeo Danaos! Yes we must fear the philosophers even when they overthrow error, for we can be certain that they do it only to set a more terrible error in the place of the old. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes! The Christian must fear the philosopher even when he wishes to free him from all heretics and actually frees him. Let us fear him; No! let us only be on our guard when we now see how Hegel overthrows the principle of the theology of feeling and sets up his — certainly only more terrible — principle. He wishes to draw the proper consequence of that standpoint, namely it is to become serious with the sublation of the finite; but in order that this may happen, he says, the I must in its individuality, in deed and actuality, renounce itself***).“

116 To this, then, had it to come with the Christian world and theology, that a philosopher, and indeed the most terrible, the most frightful philosopher, had to tell them the truth and reproach them with their sins, their vanity, their pride, their hypocrisy, their measureless arrogance and bring it to their consciousness? A philosopher had to say to the priests and prophets that they are „fools in prophesying and speak out their own judgments**)?“ A philosopher then — terrible! — had to say to the theologians that „the finite, which raises itself to the infinite, is only abstract identity, empty in itself, the highest form of untruth, the lie, evil?“ A philosopher! Indeed a philosopher! But what good can a philosopher bring us? He has overthrown the theology of feeling: what will he give us in its place? Timeo Danaos! Yes we must fear the philosophers even when they overthrow error, for we can be certain that they do it only to set a more terrible error in the place of the old. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes! The Christian must fear the philosopher even when he wishes to free him from all heretics and actually frees him. Let us fear him; No! let us only be on our guard when we now see how Hegel overthrows the principle of the theology of feeling and sets up his — certainly only more terrible — principle. He wishes to draw the proper consequence of that standpoint, namely it is to become serious with the sublation of the finite; but in order that this may happen, he says, the I must in its individuality, in deed and actuality, renounce itself***).“ *) Ibid. I, 181-184. **) Isa. 28, 7. ***) Phil. of Relig. I, 188. 58 The Religious Relation so that it is in fact the „sublated particular subjectivity, which recognises an objective, which counts as true, is recognised as the affirmative, is posited for the I and in which I am sublated.“ Religion now is this doing, which recognises the universal and, in that the I distinguishes the universal from this, at the same time places itself in relation to it. The consciousness of myself I can in this relation have only in the manner that I „in the relation to the universal substance am reflected upon myself and distinguish myself from this object — the universal —*).“ I give myself up in the universal: how then can I, when I reflect upon myself out of this, appear? How am I determined in this relation? „I am determined as finite, but in a true manner, finite as distinguished from this object, as the particular against the universal, as the accidental in this substance, as a moment, as a difference determined, which at the same time is not for itself, but which has renounced itself and knows itself as finite.“

117 What does it mean, however, that I am a moment in this object? „The universal object, answers Hegel, is substance moving within itself, is inner process, as which it generates its content.“ For if on the standpoint of immediate knowledge the I in its finitude is everything and everything objective disappears, so on the contrary now the universal, which is the object, is asserted as the totality into which the entire content, thus also the whole relation about which it is concerned, falls. The universal, the substance, is not empty, but the „absolute fulfilment,“ everything, all particularity, thus also I belongs to the universal, it is overarching against me, it proves through its own movement me as finite, but if I am also finite, I am yet now a „mo*) Ibid. I, 191. 192. as Substantiality-Relation. ment in this life, a moment which has its particular being, its subsistence only in this substance and in its essential moments.“

118 This and only this pantheism and this conception of the substantiality-relation is what underlies the Hegelian conception of the concept of religion. This pantheism comes openly and unashamedly to light when Hegel lets the substance complete its inner movement. For if the finite spirit is itself a moment of the universal, then its knowledge and consciousness of the same cannot be thought as a relation in which both, the object and the I, were separated. Consciousness falls rather into the movement and development of the universal itself, the universal — Hegel calls it in its completion, which it has attained in the consciousness of itself, the absolute spirit — it is the universal which first closes itself to consciousness in the finite spirit, by lifting this out of its finitude and drawing it into its inner movement. It is the absolute spirit which in the finite spirit relates itself to itself, i.e., relates to itself, in short religion is this self-consciousness of the absolute spirit. The finite consciousness is a form of appearance which the universal, the substance, has given itself, it is an inner difference which the universal posits in itself and which it must posit, because it can only mediate itself through consciousness or the finite spirit and only through this self-finitisation can attain to being knowledge of itself. Religion is therefore not only an affair of man, but the highest determination and the affair of the absolute idea itself*).

119 In religion the entire wealth of the natural and spiritual world has concentrated itself into its single substance and it is this substance which in the finite spirit raises itself to knowledge, to self-consciousness of itself and

120 and knows itself as the essence, as well as everything determinate as a moment of itself.

121 This substance, however, is the essence of all that the historical spirit has created, worked and acquired in its world; as this object it is therefore „no foreign, no other, transcendent object of consciousness, but its in-itself, its essence*); if therefore the finite spirit has the absolute essence as its object, it knows it as its essence, it is as consciousness of the substance necessarily self-consciousness. It is one act, one movement, when the universal knows itself in the finite consciousness and the finite spirit contemplates its essence in the universal. It is the one and same self-consciousness of the substance.

122 „Come now, and let us reason together**).“ All Hegelians who still live in the dream that the philosophy of their master agrees with the Christian faith in a personal God and a Redeemer of fallen men, or can be brought into agreement, all who still stand in this self-deception, we challenge — come and prove to us that our presentation of the Hegelian exposition is not faithful, prove to us that Christ and Belial, that pantheism and biblical truth, that death and life agree. You will remain in arrears with the proof. But do not come to us with your talk of the absolute spirit or of the overarching subjectivity; do not appeal either to the so often abused word of your master, that the substance is to be grasped as subject. O, you deceived and shortsighted ones! Did your master then say that the substance is a determinate, a single subject? Did he say that it is the primal subject, the primal individual, which created heaven and earth? Did you not notice that your soul-murdering father only wished to say and has carried out in his system, that the substance is to be grasped *) Ibid. I, 206. 207. **) Isa. 1, 18. as Substantiality-Relation. 61 in general only in the category of subjectivity, so that namely its inner process be led to that point where it opens itself to self-consciousness in the finite spirit and draws its dark abyss into the point of light of subjectivity and takes from it its darkness, its terrible gloom? Can the substance, when it wishes to bring its infinite wealth to consciousness, content itself with one subject? One is too little for it! Only from the chalice of the whole realm of spirits does infinity foam for it. Many, infinitely many subjects must it expend and bring to the point that they renounce their finitude, so that it can lay out its inner treasures. Many finite spirits must be crushed and pressed, a world of spirits must offer itself as sacrifice, if the substance is to become subject.

To caress you with fragrance,
To increase your joys,
Budding must a thousand roses
First in flames expire.

To possess a little flask,
Which holds the scent for ever,
Slender as your finger-tips,
There is need of a world;

A world of life-impulses,
Which, in their fullness' urge,
Already divined the bulbul's
love-Stirring song.

Should that torment torment us,
Since it increases our pleasure?
Has not myriads of souls
Timur's dominion consumed?*)

„Myriads of souls!“ Do you hear it? Myriads of souls must be expended, a world of life-impulses must be crushed *) Phil. of Rel. II, 282, 62 The Religious Relation and perish in the sacrificial glow, if the substance is to gain its Timur's dominion. O, do not deceive yourselves! Rather hear how your master sings you a siren song to sweeten your pains, no! to drown out your cries, as those peoples did when they offered their children to Moloch! „Should that torment torment us, Since it increases our pleasure?“ „The pain, hear it! — the pain which the finite feels in this sublation, does not pain, since it thereby raises itself to a moment in the process of the divine*).“ „The spirit is this, to know itself eternally, to exclude itself into finite sparks of light of individual consciousness and to gather and grasp itself again out of this finitude, in that in the finite consciousness the knowledge of its essence and thus the divine self-consciousness arises. Out of the fermentation of finitude, as it transforms itself into foam, the spirit wafts forth**).“ „Should that torment torment us, Since it increases our pleasure?“ Well, can you still deny? Either submit to this sweet torment or turn away from the Antichrist! „Walk not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor sit in the seat of the scornful***).“ Withdraw yourselves, before „upon the wicked he shall rain snares, fire and brimstone, and an horrible tempest: this shall be the portion of their cup+).“ But do not think that you can escape the torment and yet secretly enjoy its sweetness! Remember the saying: „Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter*).“ Search yourselves, we conjure you, smite upon your breast, you have not yet fallen so deep as the rabble of the younger pupils! Deny no longer the true character of the system, for hitherto we have still held that your inconsistency and blindness proceeded from a still and secret influence of Christianity and piety, and we still believe it at this moment: if you, however, even now will not admit the true character of the system, then we must assume that you have inner delight and joy in its diabolical nature — then fare you hence!

123 We proceed, however, to show how Hegel himself sublated this conception of religion as the substantiality-relation and surrendered the universal, which according to that conception seemed to confront the finite I as an independent absolute power, as prey to the I and drew it into self-consciousness. The outrage completes itself. It would indeed be astonishing if a man who understood all the arts of dialectic had not used the superiority and advantage which the, albeit finite, but yet living and actual consciousness possessed over an impersonal substance. Prometheus already had cheated his god of the flesh of the sacrificial animals and left him the bones and the watching at the feast of men, what then can we expect from the modern Titan, who no longer heeded the living God at all and thought he had to do only with a substance lifeless in itself? How easy was it to cheat it, to deny it entirely, if its self-consciousness was the self-consciousness of the finite spirit? Was self-consciousness then not only one in itself? And does not the Living One alone have right? Thus the self-consciousness of man now becomes everything, everything, it becomes the All and to it belongs the universality which was seemingly ascribed to the substance. This cunning Hegel had always had in *) Isa. 5, 20. 64 The Religious Relation mind when he polemicised against immediate knowledge and against the theology of feeling. He did not combat these forms of consciousness because they drew all truth, all actuality into the I: on the contrary, he himself expressed that this standpoint „borders on the philosophical,“ it contains „the subjectivity and unity of the finite and infinite“ — all determinations which are „true and essential moments of freedom and the idea.“ Hegel accuses it only of inconsistency, that it has not freed itself from the finitude of the I just as from God and the objective. It is perfectly correct what is asserted on that standpoint, that subjectivity is everything, that it „develops all objectivity out of itself,“ just as it is the fire in which all objective determinations, all that subsists and positive, consume themselves and are annihilated; but that is only the defect of this standpoint, that that fire has not yet glowed through and consumed everything. One enemy still remains, the finite I, I, This one, which is the only reality, still counts in its immediacy and naturalness; everything is burnt, only the finite I as such is not*). Does it wish then to remain finite forever, Hegel thunders at it, does it fear the fire and the conflagration which it has thrown into the universe, does it not wish to plunge itself into the pyre, is it cowardly when it concerns its finitude? It must plunge itself into the fire or throw the conflagration also into its interior, into its naturalness, so that it may emerge from this sacrificial fire as the Absolute and now rule as the Only, the Almighty in God's stead, whom it had already negated before.

124 It is clear: even the substantiality-relation Hegel lets count only for a moment, namely only as a moment of the movement in which the finite consciousness renounces its finitude: the substance is only the momentary fire in which the I sacrifices its finitude and limitation. The conclusion of the movement is not the substance, but the *) Phil. of Rel. I, 184, 185. as Substantiality-Relation. self-consciousness which has really posited itself as infinite and has taken up the universality of the substance as its essence into itself. The substance is only the power which consumes the finitude of the I and then falls prey to the infinite self-consciousness. Those have understood their master very badly who believed that he wished to lead them to the living God when he combated and killed the bad subjectivity of the theology of feeling, and those also have not grasped him who thought that he remained standing in the substantiality-relation of pantheism. They have not recognised the depths of Satan*). Only the I is to him the substance, is to him everything, but the I which has the diabolical pride to see itself as universal, infinite self-consciousness. Therefore only did he combat those who held feeling for the highest, because in his view they were stupid devils and the cunning of evil, the last rebellion against God and world was still too high for them and beyond their powers.

125 We could now proceed at once and illuminate the depths of Satan in the philosophy of religion itself. It would also be very easy for us to demonstrate in all the determinations set forth here that religion is grasped only as work and form of appearance of self-consciousness. We shall, however, take another course, namely look around at Hegel's other works, in order to demonstrate in them also the same contempt and degradation of religion, of the divine essence, of revelation, and to convince everyone who could still doubt whether we have grasped the meaning of the philosopher. Afterwards we shall then return again to the philosophy of religion.

126 „Arise, for the Lord hath delivered the host of the Midianites into your hands**).“

127 The Religious Relation as Substantiality-Relation.

128 First we shall take into view a spectre which gave much trouble to Hegel's oldest adherents, who believed in its reality, and to the previous opponents of the system, who combated it; this spectre we shall first take into view, in order to show that Hegel himself did not hold it for reality and that he used its name only occasionally, when he spoke figuratively.

129 Hegel often speaks of the world-spirit and it seems that he holds it for a real power. „The world-spirit, he says*), has enough nations and individuals to depense.“ It is therefore a kind of world-Timur Tamerlane. „The long procession of spirits (namely those which appear in the history of philosophy) are the individual pulses which the One spirit uses in its life**).“ This world-spirit seems to guide history according to definite purposes: to the Jewish nation it had reserved the highest consciousness, so that from it (namely in the rise of the Christian consciousness) it might emerge as a new spirit***).“ Hegel even demands from his pupils faith in this bugbear: „It proceeds rationally. With this faith in the world-spirit we must go to history+).“

130 But what are we to think of this deity when it fares like the gods of the Chaldeans, of whom their worshippers also did not think highly++)? What can Hegel think of a deity on which he rails, as the negro reviles or beats his fetish? What respect can the philosopher have for a deity which he so often calls „sluggish+++)?“ How

131 *) Hist. of Phil. I, 50.

132 **) Ibid. III, 691.